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Abstract
The generic term ‘museum objects’ suggests that a uniform category is involved. 
But museums in various disciplines have exhibited objects according to quite 
different rules and have assigned values to them that depend on the standards 
of the field of inquiry concerned: aesthetic quality, value as a historical source, as 
a relic or as a representative item. Over time, various display conventions have 
become established, which appear to us today to be natural and that assign the 
objects to specific stimulus values. The aim of this essay is to achieve a better 
understanding of these exhibition practices and discipline-specific value standards. 
The study aims to discover why we have become accustomed to using objects in 
exhibitions in different ways, and it distinguishes between three types of object: 
work, specimen and witness. The hypothesis here is that each of these follows 
its own display conventions, forms of perception and standards of value. The 
present essay aims to situate these three types of object – work, specimen and 
witness – historically and in this way to articulate the differences in status that 
exist between them.
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The origin of the museum lies in a desire to obtain knowledge through contact with objects. 
During the Renaissance, the precursor or prototype for today’s museums developed: the 
cabinets of arts and curiosities, with their colourful mixtures of objects from nature, from the 
arts and sciences, and from antiquity. The rooms were intended to bring together the entire 
universe in all the abundance of its phenomena within a small space, reflecting the macrocosm 
in a microcosm (cf. MacGregor 2007). The specialization of the sciences that took place during 
the Enlightenment put an end to this pre-rational juxtaposition and led to the objects being 
separated: arts, weapons, instruments, natural objects and relics of historical events were 
no longer placed in the same rooms, but were distributed to art museums, arsenals, and to 
museums of natural history and history.
Each of these classes of museum disciplined the objects in its own way: they exhibited 
them in accordance with specific rules and assigned a value (cf. Frow 1995) to them that 
depended on the standards of the discipline concerned: aesthetic quality, value as a historical 
source, as a relic, or as a representative item. In short, value describes those features that 
make the object appear museum-worthy in the eyes of art scholars, biologists, archaeologists, 
or historians (to name but a few). Depending on the type of museum concerned, various ideas 
developed about which objects were museum-worthy for what reasons, and about the way in 
which they should be exhibited. Over time, various display conventions became established 
that appear to us today to be natural, so to speak, and which assign the objects to specific 
stimulus values in our perception.
The aim of this essay is to achieve a better understanding of these exhibition practices and 
discipline-specific value standards. Its purpose is to find out why we have become accustomed 
to displaying objects in various ways in exhibitions, and it distinguishes between three types 
of object: work, specimen, and witness.2 The hypothesis here is that each of these follows 
its own display conventions, forms of perception and standards of value. In the fields of art 
studies and literary studies, these are based on aesthetic theory; in the natural sciences, they 
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are based on taxonomies; and in the field of general history, they are based on the concept of 
source. The present essay aims to situate these three types of object – work, specimen and 
witness – historically and in this way to articulate the differences in status that exist between 
them. In the process, it also inquires into the extent to which originality (and, closely related 
to that, authenticity3) – regarded as implying ‘a work composed firsthand’4 – is relevant to the 
value of each group of objects (cf. Sofka 1985; Schärer 1994).
The essay – which is mainly based on examples in Germany – is divided into the three 
types of object: work, specimen and witness. Each section starts with a recent example case 
in order to present the display characteristics for each group of objects. The argument is then 
given a basis in the research literature and an attempt is made, using a few example theories 
and historical examples, to understand why specific usages, display conventions and value 
attributions were able to arise; this ultimately allows more precise definition of the three types of 
object. The core of the argument lies in showing that the status of work, specimen and witness 
is not assigned to objects in any quasi-natural sense, but is the result of curatorial practice. 
Objects are not in themselves work, specimen, or witness; it is we who make them into these.
Work
Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (La Gioconda, 1502/03) hangs in Room 6 of the Denon 
Wing of the Louvre. It is in a solitary position on a large monochrome wall, behind reinforced 
glass, and has three museum guards assigned to it. A wooden balustrade and black cordons 
hold off the mass of visitors who crowd round the museum’s most famous work every day, 
diligently photographing it and barely noticing the other 50 or so other paintings that are also 
in Room 6. They are not able to read the museum label for the object, and in any case it only 
includes a little basic information. But that is not what matters here: they all want to see the 
original of a painting that has long since been familiar to them from photographs, posters and 
souvenirs. There is one simple reason why they have nevertheless come to stand in front of 
the picture: it is because only this Mona Lisa is from da Vinci’s own hand. This is the basis 
for its authenticity, understood here as meaning certified origin, vouched for (authorized) by 
the artist’s signature, or at least attributable to the work beyond any doubt. This authenticity 
is the decisive criterion for the value of the painting, and this original can only be seen here 
in the Louvre (cf. Newman/Bloom 2011).
Historical approach: display value and originality as core values of the work
Uniqueness and originality were not always the most important criteria for the value of art. 
The ascent of the original to become the central fetish of the art museum took place during 
the eighteenth century (Hooper-Greenhill 1992: 142), and this history is also reflected in a 
characteristic episode in the Louvre. In 1797, the museum’s board of directors hired the art dealer 
Jean-Baptiste-Pierre Lebrun as commissaire expert; four years earlier, he had demonstrated 
that the museum’s catalogue contained numerous errors of attribution. As commissaire expert, 
Lebrun was authorized by the Minister or the museum to advise the members of the Louvre’s 
Conseil. He was employed by the museum because he was able to place the works in broader 
work-historical contexts and attribute them to individual artists. The Louvre also needed him 
to provide commercial expertise in assigning value to works, with the required familiarity with 
market mechanisms. As an art dealer, Lebrun was thus in a position in which he was able to 
establish, within a museum, value criteria that were derived from the art market – precisely 
during a period in which Napoleonic raids were pouring countless art treasures from all over 
Europe into the museums of Paris (cf. Guichard 2011).
This unprecedented expansion in numbers of art works from all over Europe permanently 
changed the value standards used in the world of museum art. The material of the works and 
their aesthetic valeurs, as well as certified origination from the master’s hand, became what 
determined artistic value. These criteria drawn from the art market represented a complete 
break with the primacy of education and instruction, which had been ‘faithful to the academic 
tradition of providing instruction based on casts and copies’ (ibid.: 97). Instead, works now 
came to be assessed in terms of their rarity, richness of detail and material quality.
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It was during this period that the original rose to prominence in museum discourse – and 
a new figure appeared on the museum stage along with it: the connoisseur.5 ‘As connoisseurship 
evolved into art, the question of authenticity became an essential factor in determining the value 
of works of art …’ (Bazin 1967: 116). The connoisseur was familiar with the material through 
his constant dealing with it, not merely because he was familiar with formal characteristics and 
iconographic traditions – like the artists in the old Académie Royale de Peinture et Sculpture 
under the ancien régime – but also because as a dealer he travelled widely and knew and 
was able to compare collection contexts, local art traditions and holdings of works at home 
and abroad. This type of connoisseur was able to penetrate deeply into the biography of the 
works and the contexts in which they were created, and was familiar with the peculiarities of 
the materials used and local painting traditions. This knowledge enabled him to attribute works 
to specific artists and epochs and to certify them as originals and thus authenticate them. The 
importance of attribution followed the interests of the art market and was a new phenomenon 
in museums (Guichard 2011; Pomian 1990).6 It was the correct attribution of a painting as an 
original that from now on began to determine whether it was museum-worthy.
There is no direct line that leads from the revaluation of the original in the Louvre 
around 1800 to the present day. Even after Lebrun’s comparatively brief intermezzo in the 
Louvre (1797–1802), many art museums were still establishing large collections of copies 
and casts, particularly for educational purposes. In the German Empire, it was only during the 
museum reform movement in the years following 1870 that this was substantially questioned 
(cf. Joachimides 2001; Sheehan 2000). However, the Lebrun episode signalled a long-term 
change of attitudes in which authenticity – i.e., certified attribution to a named and known 
artist – became the central criterion for quality in art (Sheehan 2000: 91–2). The foundation 
for this change in the history of ideas lay in the querelle des Anciens et des Modernes (cf. 
Rosen 1989), and it followed economic interests.
The logic of the original is directed against the copy and it aims at exclusivity. Up to the 
seventeenth century, it was a customary practice for artists such as Rubens or Raphael also 
to sign works painted by employees according to their specifications. This patronage system 
only became unacceptable when a European art trade developed in which art works were 
treated as commodities whose value was determined by supply and demand. The fewer the 
number of pieces by a known master that were on the market, the higher their price was (cf. 
Häseler 2002: 642–3, Newman/Bloom 2011). The great Venetian masters of the seventeenth 
century produced their own works solely as commissioned pieces. It was only works by 
their employees or copies that passed onto the open market. Only the master’s hand could 
guarantee the individuality, the craftsmanship and the inspiration of a genius – in short, the 
exclusivity – that vouched for quality. This close relationship between the work and an inimitable 
individuality (of the fine artist or literary author) made the ‘author’ into the central figure and 
led to the establishment of property rights in intellectual products. With the birth of the author, 
a distinct conception of the work arose during the eighteenth century that placed value on the 
unity and boundaries of a work in order to be able to clearly define authorship and authorial 
rights (Häseler 2002: 642–3; Pomian 1990: 111).
Although the concept of the work was central for the nineteenth-century museum, it was 
severely affected by the academicization of art history. The art-historical exhibition practices 
that Christian von Mechel established in the Belvedere in Vienna at the end of the eighteenth 
century used works as evidence of sequential art-historical epochs and turned them into 
specimens (see below; cf. Pommier 2006; Meijers 1995). Several art museums copied this 
principle during the nineteenth century. Aiming for encyclopaedic completeness, they used 
plaster casts of sculptures and other replicas as specimen copies and mingled these with 
originals. It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that increasing criticism was 
raised at this primarily educational method of exhibiting, in which it was less important to show 
only genuine works from a master’s own hand than to instruct visitors in the best possible way 
about the development of art through the centuries (Klonk 2009; Sheehan 2002; Joachimides 
2001). During the German Empire, an alternative to this practice was developed by Wilhelm 
von Bode, who implemented an ‘aesthetic culture’, as it was called at the time, while he was 
Director of the Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin in 1904. This approach no longer situated 
works of art in rooms representing historical epochs, but instead isolated the individual work 
Thomas Thiemeyer: Work, specimen, witness: How different perspectives on museum objects 
alter the way they are perceived and the values attributed to them
399Museum & Society, 13 (3) 
in order to emphasize its intrinsic value as an autonomous work of art. Bode only showed 
masterpieces, which had to be originals. It was no accident that he had all the plaster casts 
removed from the museum collections and transferred to the university between 1911 and 
1913 (Joachimides 2001: 93–97).
Along with the esteem for the original masterpiece that became accepted throughout 
Europe during the nineteenth century, exhibition practices very gradually changed. Even in 
the 1870s, the Impressionists in Paris had experimented with exhibition forms that presented 
their paintings in isolation and with good lighting in front of neutral backgrounds. But the public 
did not appreciate this presentation of the paintings, deprived of any context, as they were 
looking for art that was suitable for decorating their living-rooms. Exhibition practices were still 
dominated by the style of hanging customary in the salon, with dense throngs of paintings on 
the wall, and by the residential room compositions used in the arts and crafts. Around 1900, 
the Secession exhibitions shaped the style for a new, sober aesthetics of art presentation: 
in Vienna, Koloman Moser introduced the undecorated, white exhibition space in 1903. The 
walls were now no longer covered with red velvet, but were white with no projecting decorative 
elements, and the paintings were hung at a sufficient distance from each other in a single 
row at the level of the viewer’s eye (Joachimides 2001; Grasskamp 2003; Klonk 2009). Brian 
O’Doherty later coined the term ‘white cube’ for this and described it as the ‘ideal gallery’, 
one that keeps away from the work of art everything that might disturb its appearance. The 
space is so dominant that it raises everything it displays to a timeless value in its own right 
(O’Doherty 1999; cf. Duncan/Wallach 1980).
Whereas the nineteenth century conceived of the work as a closed structure that was 
at the disposal of the author alone and depended solely on the creative genius, the avant-
gardes of the early twentieth century (particularly the Futurists) rebelled against this doctrine 
(Goldberg 2011). The new art forms of photography and film above all – but architecture as 
well – were no longer reflected in an aesthetic of the work that declared reproductions to be 
of inferior value per se. Walter Benjamin’s famous 1936 essay on the work of art provided a 
theoretical foundation for this shift (Benjamin 1973). Benjamin’s essay not only overcame the 
contradiction between the original and the copy, raising photography to the status of art; in 
addition, his theory signalled the decline of the canon. Even since the start of the twentieth 
century, the avant-garde had no longer been seeking to expand the existing canon and achieve 
acceptance into it, but rather to question it fundamentally and carry out constant innovations 
that would overcome what was old (Grasskamp 1981). Using montage and collage procedures, 
objets trouvés and ready-mades, artists such as Guillaume Apollinaire, Pablo Picasso and 
Marcel Duchamp around 1900, and later Pop Art artists, freed themselves from the concept of 
the work as an organic whole. Performance Art (Goldberg 2011), Umberto Eco’s theory of the 
‘open work of art’ (1989), and reception aesthetics (Iser 1978; Jauss 1982), along with Michel 
Foucault’s (1977) and Roland Barthes’s (1977) farewells to authorship, finally dissolved the 
traditional view of the work.
The meaning of ‘work’ in the museum context
As the above brief (and necessarily extremely sketchy) excursion into the history of the concept 
of the work and the practices used to present it shows, works are intended to create aesthetic 
pleasure and unique experience. According to an orthodox view that developed during the 
nineteenth century, the value of works lies in their aesthetic quality, which is intimately linked 
with the person of the artist, even though this close link was loosened during the twentieth 
century. Despite shifts in the importance of originality within the concept of work over time, 
it still plays a central role in works, , as it vouches for the artist’s expertise, on the one hand, 
which only becomes clear in authentic – i.e., certified7 – originals. In visitor studies, Newman 
and Bloom (2011: 1) identified ‘two key dimensions that are particularly important to the 
valuation of original artworks [today, tt]: the assessment of the art object as a unique creative 
act (performance) and the degree of physical contact with the original artist (contagion).’ The 
artistic quality is supposed to determine the aesthetic effect, making a painting appear lively 
and brilliant instead of shallow and embarrassing. Secondly, originality guarantees an initial 
act of creative production of something completely new, such as is only possible for a genius. 
400
However, these value standards are measured not solely using quality criteria that are immanent 
to the work. They follow the basic rules of the art market, in which scarce goods (which the 
originals by virtue of their uniqueness certainly are) fetch higher prices than mass-produced 
goods (Newman/Bloom 2011; Pomian 1990).
The work, however – and this is the core issue for the museum – requires originality 
because it is intended to trigger unique aesthetic experiences that are supposed to be linked 
to the originator and to the original medium and cannot be reproduced in any other form (Figal 
2010; Dutton 2009). In contrast to all other types of museum object, it is only works of fine art 
that are intended for visual reception. It is the implementation of such reception – i.e., being 
looked at – that is the purpose of their existence. All of the original visual aspects of the work 
therefore seem to be essential, as they can influence its reception. Nelson Goodman described 
this as ‘autographic art’: in autographic art works, the recipient is not able to distinguish between 
constitutive – i.e., essential – and contingent – i.e. inessential – signs that make up the work 
as a whole. Only the historically certified authenticity of an original from the artist’s hand can 
guarantee that all of the aspects that can be essential for the aesthetic effect are actually 
present (Goodman 1976: 99–123). Autographic art works feature a sensory excess that is not 
controllable (and is also incapable of being copied) – and this is precisely its meaning as a 
stimulant of the imagination and the emotions. This effect can scarcely be grasped analytically, 
although – as Pierre Bourdieu has pointed out – aesthetic experience does not overcome the 
viewer without any preconditions and it is always historically and culturally coded (Bourdieu 
1996).
From this point of view, the exclusive aesthetic experience that works of art promise is 
an experience that is learned. And it probably has not only an aesthetic and historical basis, 
but is equally a social phenomenon: it is only from the knowledge that something is regarded 
as being special that the recipient also actually perceives it as special and in the process 
unconsciously reproduces a series of positions set out by the ‘artworld’: ‘To see something as 
art requires something the eye cannot decry – an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge 
of the history of art: an artworld’ (Danto 1964: 580; cf. Newman/Bloom 2011).
The emphasis of social and context-dependent experiential qualities over aesthetics 
may be important for the sociological analysis of the effect of art. But it is secondary for the 
concept of the work that we are concerned with here. The decisive aspect here is rather that 
works of fine art, in the orthodox reading, were regarded for a long period (and still often are) 
as ‘phenomenal objects’ (Figal 2010) that promise exclusive experiences, and that this view 
led to conventions of display that continue down to the present day, even when one no longer 
necessarily shares the basic assumptions involved: The isolation of the objects in order to 
give the unique item better effect, dispensing with (visual) context information in order not to 
distract from the work’s unique atmosphere, the exclusive aura of the white cube that ennobles 
everything placed within it. These modes of display, which are linked to the physical presence 
of a specific exhibit, distinguish the work from the specimen.
Specimen
In the Linnaean nomenclature, Buceros bicornis is a great hornbill from south-east Asia. In the 
so-called ‘visible storage’ area for natural history in the Übersee-Museum in Bremen, it is found 
in a series along with other hornbills (Bucerotidae). The great hornbill stands in the upper left 
corner of a large glass showcase that fills the room. It forms the start of a biological taxonomy 
that is presented spatially, the aim of which is to show modern species as descendants of 
primitive, phylogenetically older species. In the Übersee-Museum, Buceros bicornis has an 
established place in the Linnaean encaptic classification system, which distinguishes objects 
hierarchically in a binary structure of categories using morphological characteristics. Buceros 
bicornis is a species in the genus of Buceros in the family of Bucerotidae, which along with the 
family of hoopoes belongs to the class of birds (Aves). The morphological features that give 
Buceros bicornis its place in the system include the shape of its beak and the structure of its 
plumage. The museum always exhibits only one representative of each species. Only the most 
essential information is provided for each object: its Latin name (Buceros bicornis), the year 
in which the species was first scientifically recorded (1758), and the region in which it occurs 
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(south-west India, Himalayas, Malaysia, etc.). It is not difficult to see that Buceros bicornis as 
an exhibit follows a different logic from the Mona Lisa in the Louvre: it is not uniqueness that 
is its outstanding feature, but rather its representativeness. It appears in the exhibition not as 
a unique example, but rather as a prototype; it is not a work, but a specimen.
Historical approach: systematics and representativeness as core values of the 
specimen
Work and specimen were not always subject to separate display strategies and standards of 
value. Before the rationalism of the Enlightenment transformed the  world and the sciences 
diverged into different disciplines, works of art, historical objects, and objects from the field of 
natural history all shared the same exhibition spaces. The cabinets of art and curiosities of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which were decisively promoted by humanism with its interest 
in the past and its relics, made no distinction between types of object and instead combined 
a whole miscellany of things into a marvellous theatrum naturae et artis (as Leibniz termed it) 
or a theatrum sapientiae, a theatre of wisdom, in order to present the world in microcosm. It 
was only when Francis Bacon with his empiricism and René Descartes with his mathematical 
conception of nature began to conceive of objects as sources of experimental discovery that 
artificialia and naturalia became difficult to combine in a single referential system (cf. Impey and 
MacGregor 1985; Hooper-Greenhill 1992; Bredekamp 1993; Grote 1994; MacGregor 2007).
In the age of the Enlightenment, the cosmological conceptual system on which the 
cabinets of arts and curiosities had been based collapsed. The influx of artifacts into Europe 
from all over the world required new principles of arrangement. Instead of facing problems whose 
origin lay in apparent superstition, naturalists were now aiming to obtain useful knowledge. 
The aim of collecting was no longer to represent the macrocosmos in microcosmo, the great 
world in miniature. Instead, the enlightened, rational collector distinguished art from plants, 
coins from instruments, and weapons from sculptures (Grote 1994; MacGregor 2007). The 
search for the laws of nature required average and normal phenomena, and unusual, isolated 
cases became less important (Bennett 1995: 41). Specialized collections were intended to 
make objects comparable, and a reduction in variety was intended to provide better insight 
into what was essential.
Michel Foucault described this as representing a transition from the ‘age of the theatre’ 
to the ‘age of the catalogue’ and provided a clear example of the process in the collections 
of Ulysse Aldrovandi and the theatre of nature that he established in Bologna around 1570. 
Aldrovandi was still collecting all sorts of information about his objects – along with the anatomy, 
procreation and habitat of the stuffed animals, also noting methods of capturing them, their 
allegorical uses, legends about them, and the ‘best ways of cooking [their] flesh’ (Foucault 
1970: 129). By contrast, the naturalist Jan Jonston in his Natural History of Quadrupeds in 1657 
only needed twelve characteristics, almost all of which were visible and could be observed, 
to characterize and classify his objects. Whereas for Aldrovandi, a plethora of objects and 
information was intended to reflect the richness of the world, Jonston radically minimized 
objects and information. ‘The essential difference lies in what is missing in Jonston’ (ibid.). 
The reduction in information meant that nature was arranged using only a few characteristics, 
making it possible to establish new relationships. As these were morphological characteristics, 
the observing gaze was the decisive analytical operation: ‘To observe, then, is to be content 
with seeing – with seeing a few things systematically’ (ibid.: 134). In other words, every detail 
of an object is no longer of equal importance because it leads directly to God; instead, the 
researcher concentrates on the differential characteristic (such as the shape of the beak or 
the structure of the plumage) that distinguishes one species from another. The specimen has 
been born.
A conceptual system based on the use of specimens emerged with Linnaeus’s Systema 
Naturae in 1735. Linnaeus arranged organisms in an encaptic binary system following clearly 
defined morphological characteristics in which lower-level groups are incorporated into the 
group at the next level up (Buceros bicornis is a species in the genus Buceros in the family of 
Bucerotidae). In this system, the individual object was no longer relevant as an individual, but 
was arranged into series of similar objects. It was consequently museums of natural history that 
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established seriality as a principle of museum presentation and thus (re-)translated Linnaeus’s 
basic idea into a spatial diagram (Linnaeus himself generated his taxonomies from spatial 
arrangements of specimens in cabinets). In the natural history museums of Vienna or Berlin, 
the arrangements of the exhibition collections from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
placing objects of the same species and genus in glass cases, can still be seen today. These 
arrangements were the public face of the research collections and reproduced their taxonomic 
logic (Jahn 1979/80; Köstring 2003, Kretschmann 2006).
However, the origin of the specimen did not lie in natural-history collections alone. Art 
museums also began to arrange their exhibitions in accordance with new scientific and scholarly 
principles – and the central principle for the nineteenth century, with its faith in history, was 
that of chronology. This replaced the older principle of ‘curiosity’ derived from the cabinets of 
arts and curiosities, which linked objects associatively and conceived of the museum as a 
poetically organized theatre, rather than as a classifying catalogue (cf. Bann 2003). Between 
1779 and 1781, a copperplate engraver named Christian von Mechel arranged the Imperial 
and Royal Art Gallery in the Belvedere summer palace in Vienna. He framed and labelled the 
paintings consistently, catalogued the art works and followed the exhibition principle of the 
galleria progressiva – i.e., presenting a chronological series of paintings in a linear sequence 
instead of hanging the walls densely as picturesque compositions, as had previously been 
the practice. Mechel arranged his paintings according to schools of art and subordinated 
the individual aesthetic effect of the single work to its place in the series (Pommier 2006; te 
Heesen 2012).
Mechel’s approach was a provocative one, as it was no longer presenting art for the 
sake of aesthetic enjoyment (as a ‘feast for the eyes’), but rather with a rationalistic claim to 
be introducing a system of arrangement that was equally applicable to both art history and 
natural history. Mechel’s arrangement in the Belvedere in Vienna heralded a new epoch: 
instead of the associative assembly of disparate objects preferred in the poetically composed 
cabinets of arts and curiosities, the new museums subordinated their objects to a consistent 
system that followed scientific arrangements and explained itself to the viewer without a 
personal intermediary. The series and classification system gave the objects a scholarly frame 
of reference, no longer presenting a juxtaposition of disparate elements, but rather grouping 
similar objects together (cf. Meijers 1995).
In the nineteenth century, during which art history was emerging as a separate 
academic discipline, more and more museums began to follow this principle of presenting 
an art-historical encyclopedia. They established large collections of plaster casts and copies 
in order to close the gaps in their collections. Whereas copies were scarcely acceptable in 
the case of paintings, as the quality of reproduction was too poor, the plaster cast procedure 
for sculptures and busts was traditional, particularly since the reproduction technique in this 
case allowed precise mechanical imitation. From the planning of the collection of casts in the 
Neues Museum in Berlin starting in 1841 to the establishment of the Musée des Sculptures 
Comparées in the Trocadéro in Paris in 1882, these museums of reproduction enjoyed an 
unprecedented boom. (Joachimides 2001: 30). 
It was only when the flood of objects in the depositories began to make the ideal of 
a complete, textbook-like presentation of the entire history of art appear utopian, and the 
museum reformers at the end of the nineteenth century began to demand quality instead of 
quantity and fresh principles for hanging (Lichtwark 1991; Joachimides 2001), that the period 
of the great collections of copies ended. Art again became a work, rather than a specimen.
The meaning of specimen in the museum context
In contrast to the work, which expresses the individuality of its creator and is therefore regarded 
as inimitable in every detail, the specimen is reduced to only a few characteristic features that 
place it in a specific species, family, or class. The decisive element is not the individual object, 
but the relationship between objects. Together, they can create knowledge that transcends 
what is feasible for an individual piece. Specimens are placeholders in a scientific system, 
representing examples typical of a specific species, technique, or material. Their value consists 
precisely in this representativeness (cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1991: 390–2). In 1918, Benjamin 
Gilman summed up this distinction in the memorable formula, 
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We call an object a specimen when we think of certain qualities in which it 
resembles other things. We call it on the other hand a unicum when we think of 
qualities in which it differs from any other thing. (Gilman 2008: 130). 
Originality is of secondary importance in specimens, provided that a copy can display all the 
relevant characteristics in the same quality. In contrast to the work, the specimen functions 
as an information medium, as a vehicle for information. Once the latter has been obtained, 
the vehicle (i.e., the original object) becomes dispensable, as the scientist or scholar can note 
or repeat the findings he has gained from the specimen. This is the transition from the trace, 
which can only be read in the original object and is linked to it, to data, which can be stored, 
reproduced in a different form, compared with other data and processed into facts (as in a 
report or graphic diagram, for example) (Rheinberger 2011). Bruno Latour has succinctly and 
plausibly described this process of information processing and information transformation as 
a system of ‘circulating reference’ (Latour 1999).
However, it is not the case that originality plays no role at all in the specimen. 
Specimens are artificial categories that are derived from the system to which they 
are subordinated. Even in a specimen in a natural-history museum, originality is 
important, because each specimen shows slight differences that illustrate the vari-
ety of species and variety within a species (Knell 2004: 25–32).
It is scarcely possible to reproduce this, as it first needs to be recognized and 
recorded; secondly, it is sometimes only discoverable using methods developed 
later (as in genetic analyses, which are based not on visible morphological differ-
ences but on the original organic material); thirdly, reproductions always eliminate 
information that appears irrelevant from the current point of view but may become 
important when different questions are addressed to the objects or new analytical 
procedures become important. This conception of originality is not a matter of aes-
thetic effect, however, but an epistemological concept. It is derived from a scientific 
interest in cognition and not from psychological effects such as those suggested 
by the terms ‘aura’ and ‘authenticity’. This functional relationship to the materiality 
of the objects distinguishes the specimen not only from the work, but also from the 
witness.
Witness
In the Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Museum of the History of the 
Federal Republic of Germany) in Bonn, there is a black Mercedes-Benz 300. In the 1950s, 
the limousine was one of the young Federal Republic’s first status symbols. The Haus der 
Geschichte presents it in front of a large photo that shows the vehicle as a state limousine in 
actual use and supplements it with film clips that tell the story of the car and its former owner. 
The car was an elegant vehicle with a tall radiator grille, sweeping wings, and projecting 
headlight eyes, which had become slightly obsolete. The aesthetic appeal of the bodywork 
is admittedly not the reason why several visitors to the Museum of History pause beside the 
vehicle for a long time, attentively reading the texts and looking at the pictures surrounding it. 
The Mercedes 300 is equally far from being important as a typical representative of the cars 
of its time. The reason why this Mercedes 300 interests visitors to the Museum of History is its 
well-known owner: Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic, 
had this Mercedes delivered to him at the Chancellor’s Office in 1951, and he used it as an 
official conveyance. The standards with the federal flags on the vehicle’s wings still indicate 
this. The Mercedes 300, popularly known as ‘the Adenauer’, is on display in Bonn not as a 
specimen of early 1950s cars, or as a work illustrating the car-making achievements of the 
period, but as a witness.8 It is a memento, and the effect created by its presence lies in the 
aura of its former owner.
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Historical approach: source value and ‘affective value’ as core values of the witness
As Otto Lauffer, a museum director in Frankfurt, already pointed out in 1907, it was not the 
exemplary usage value that was of interest in mementos, 
but rather a very specific purpose that they only served on a single occasion at 
a historically important moment. It is the memory of a significant historical event 
or of outstanding historical personalities associated with it – not in an externally 
visible way, but attested to through oral tradition or written documentation – that 
gives it its value (Lauffer 1907: 13). 
This ‘affective value’ (as Lauffer termed it) is associated with the object because it represents 
a thread from the mantle of history.
The Humanists – who established large collections of antiquities as illustrative material 
testifying to ancient grandeur and assisting in the understanding of ancient texts – already 
appreciated the object in its capacity as a witness (cf. Pomian 1994; Burke 1998). The best-
loved antiquities were the masterpieces of classical art – the busts, sculptures and frescoes that 
served as models for the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In addition to these, the scholars of 
those years also surrounded themselves with everyday objects with no special artistic value – 
medals and coins, fragments of stone, or buckles – to enable them to approach as closely as 
possible to the ancient world which they so much venerated. These material relics suggested 
a truth and truthfulness that were lacking in the ancient texts, whose credibility scholars had 
already substantially questioned. The antiquities were to serve as a window into the past and 
help the Humanists to empathize with the distant epoch as much as possible (Pomian 1990: 84).
The object as witness was also the focus during the French Revolution and the 
development of Europe’s nation-states. During this period, when the rampages of the 
revolutionaries and armies were destroying thousands and thousands of pictures, statues, 
archives, books and monuments in order to sweep away every memory of the ancien régime, 
people in France began to reflect on the patrimoine, the nation’s cultural legacy. This was 
regarded primarily as involving its important works of art. The category also included objects 
testifying to the greatness of the nation or important events during the Revolution. This was 
the emergence of an awareness of the commemorative value of objects and of the value of 
‘heritage’ (patrimoine, kulturelles Erbe). This awareness soon spread to other countries in Europe, 
with national museums being established during this period in Stockholm (1792), Budapest 
(1802), Brussels (1803), Madrid (1815) and Prague (1818), as well as the Germanisches 
Nationalmuseum in Nuremberg (1852). They all had the task of sifting through the nation’s 
material heritage, recording it and safeguarding it (Bazin 1967: 169–75; Poulot 2001: 50–76).
Nineteenth-century historicism carried this cult of preservation and commemoration to 
unprecedented lengths. Museums, archives and memorial sites to poets and other personalities 
sprang up everywhere. Museification of the objects for national and identity-establishing 
purposes was not always good for them, and the museum and its objects were among the 
targets when Friedrich Nietzsche attacked ‘the stifling of life by the historical’ and polemicized 
against ‘the malady of history’ in his essay ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life’ in 1874 (Nietzsche 1997: 121). This was linked with a rejection of what Nietzsche called 
‘antiquarian history’, that ‘knows only how to preserve life, not how to engender it’ (ibid.: 75). 
In brief, Nietzsche regarded the nineteenth century’s obsession with history as problematic, 
because it tended to inhibit and paralyse prospects for progress. And the avant-gardes of 
the early twentieth century – with the Futurists at their head – were soon to follow him in this 
general critique of the nineteenth century’s cult of preservation.
This critique – which was expressed on many sides during this period (cf. Valéry 1960; 
Malraux 1967; Benjamin 1973; Lichtwark 1991) – put the museum and its works of art under 
pressure. The museum reformers (such as Alfred Lichtwark, Ludwig Justi, Hugo von Tschudi 
and Wilhelm von Bode in Germany) in particular turned the venerable institution of the museum 
upside down and tried to make it interesting to wider groups of visitors by explaining the objects 
(better) and in a less elitist way (Klonk 2009: 55–72; Joachimides 2001; Grasskamp 1981). 
The critique made hardly any impression on the status of the object as witness, however – and 
the two world wars also made no small contribution. During the First World War, museum-
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based and private war collections sprang up throughout all of the countries involved in the 
hostilities, in order to document the truth about the events (cf. Brandt 1994). The industrial 
mass murder of the European Jews that began some twenty years later ultimately made the 
object as a witness into an imperative for the twentieth century’s politics of memory, with the 
memorials in the former concentration camp buildings becoming the paradigmatic sites for this 
(Thiemeyer 2010; Williams 2007). The Nazis had carried out the murder of the detainees in their 
extermination camps in order to extinguish every trace of their existence. Faced with impending 
defeat, they tried to erase every trace of the monstrous crime – for decades encouraging the 
fantasies of those who wanted to deny that the Holocaust had ever taken place. The German 
memorial sites newly erected after the Second World War thus had a dual problem: on the one 
hand, they were to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and their suffering, although 
they held hardly any objects that would enable them to fulfil this commemorative task, since 
the Nazi annihilation machine had tried to eliminate all of the objective traces. On the other 
hand, they needed such objects not only as witnesses of human existence and suffering, but 
also as evidence that the Holocaust had taken place in such a way and not otherwise. The 
objects were the strongest arguments against the Holocaust deniers and had a quasi-judicial 
status as circumstantial evidence.
To enable objects to function correspondingly as witnesses, Holocaust memorial 
sites in Germany developed a specific documentary presentation style that used objects as 
sources. What is known as ‘historical documentation’, as seen today in the concentration camp 
memorial sites in Buchenwald, Dachau and Sachsenhausen (and which influenced various 
historical museums in Germany, such as the Historical Museum in Frankfurt in 1972–1975 
and the German–Russian Museum in Berlin in 1995; cf. Thiemeyer 2010), always shows 
exhibits in context and explains them with long text panels and supplementary documents 
(photos, reproductions of official letters, etc.). The objects stand for a historical narrative, 
which they relate or which is related through them. The presentations make a clear distinction 
here between original remains (usually the ruins of the old camp buildings) and documents 
introduced later. The original substance and the museum aids remain at a distance both 
visually and architecturally, to avoid reducing the effect of the ‘authentic relics’ (Knigge/Frei 
2005; Faulenbach/Jelich 1994).
In this context, it is obvious that the originality of the relics is essential: only the originals 
vouch for the reality of a past event, its existence, because a material relic of it has remained. 
The key word in this context is authenticity; in the case of the object as witness, it refers to 
‘the quality of historical testimony, rather than the aesthetic value’ (Korff 2007: 121–2). And it 
is this authenticity that establishes their added emotional effect.
In his 1936 essay on the work of art, Walter Benjamin calls this the ‘aura’, the source of 
which he sees as lying in the hic et nunc of objects handed down by tradition. ‘The presence of 
the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity … The whole sphere of authenticity 
is outside technological … reproducibility.’ (Benjamin 1973: 222). 
‘The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its 
beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which 
it has experienced … what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is 
affected is the authority of the object.’ (ibid.: 223). 
For Benjamin, ‘substantive duration’ meant that the substance in front of one derived from 
another time, as a ‘testimony to history’, that only the originals as material relics can vouch 
for an ontological connection with the reality of a past event. The objects function as pieces 
of circumstantial evidence that have a history and which authenticate history. This is what 
Benjamin means by the ‘authority of the object’, which is jeopardized if an object is not original. 
Its history is not capable of being copied. It is linked to the original.
Benjamin’s concept of the object as a guarantor that holds material authority – although 
introduced for works of art – becomes obvious in the face of the extermination camps of the ‘Third 
Reich’. There is hardly anything that testifies more impressively to the scale of the millionfold 
extermination than the mountain of spectacles in the concentration camp memorial at Auschwitz. 
The index link to the past gives the museum object evidentiary value and distinguishes it, for 
example, from presentations of literary history (cf. Young 1988: 95–6). This is precisely the 
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point at which the museum has the advantage with the presence of its objects. They bear 
the traces with which a person has perpetuated himself in them, or which a past event has 
inscribed in them. Traces always indicate something that is absent. They are objective and 
arise through touch; they reveal themselves materially (Krämer 2007; cf. also Ginzburg 1989).
This function of presence is central for grasping the total effect of the object as a 
witness. The witness cannot be reduced to a piece of evidence or a document. Its emotional 
effect is not linked to the way in which it refers to victims or to the existence of a historical 
event. Adenauer’s Mercedes does nothing of this sort. What it shares with the evidence of 
the Holocaust, however, is the ability to make objects visually present; it brings the past into 
the here and now (cf. Mersch 2002; Gumbrecht 2004). Adenauer’s ‘Adenauer’ is marvelled 
at because it makes something of the person of the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
present. Only a vehicle which the Chancellor actually used is capable of doing this.
The meaning of witness in the museum context
The museum object as witness functions as source and/or as an emotional object. Sources – 
according to the standard definition used in Germany, by Paul Kirn – are ‘all texts, objects or 
facts from which knowledge of the past can be gained’ (Brandt 1996: 48). Objects as sources 
tell a story through their traces, help to make the past comprehensible, and can serve as 
evidence. Their traces provide information about historical situations and milieus, which one can 
reconstruct from evidence in the material. These traces represent the start of an interpretation 
and are not its result. However, they often only become comprehensible if they also provide 
additional information pointing to the traces and clarifying them. Precisely this is the goal of 
contextualizing presentation: it is only through the information about Chancellor Adenauer as 
the owner, the flags on the car’s wings and the supplementary pictorial and audio documents 
that the object is recognized as being of importance and is perceived as being a significant 
historical relic.
However, creating or confirming knowledge is only one effect of the witness, which 
can in addition also touch the viewer emotionally. Stephen Greenblatt has described this 
dual potency using the formula ‘resonance and wonder’. ‘Resonance’ marks the object as a 
representative of a distant culture or time, as a trace in foreign lands or in the past, into which it 
draws visitors and offers them new discoveries. ‘Wonder’ refers to the recipient’s astonishment 
and is related to the emotional effect of an object (Greenblatt 2004). Museum objects as 
witnesses are surrounded by an aura that arises from an awareness of their involvement in 
a historically important event or connection with a historical situation, or that results from a 
link to an important person. This effect – which Otto Lauffer described as the ‘affective value’ 
– arises above all when it is confirmed (or at least not disproved) that an object was part of 
the event or was in direct contact with the person. The Ducal Crypt in Weimar lost one of its 
main attractions in 2010 when DNA analysis showed that none of the bones that have been 
preserved there for over 200 years in the coffin of the poet Friedrich Schiller actually belonged 
to him. The objects thus became valueless as witnesses, both epistemically (in relation to their 
source) and also emotionally (in terms of ‘affective value’) – and Schiller’s sarcophagus has 
since remained empty.
Work, specimen, and witness as results of curatorial practice
I have attempted here, using example cases and theories from various specialist contexts and 
museum genres, to show that the three types of object – work, specimen and witness – are 
fundamentally different. Four points appear to me to be central here: the objects differ firstly 
in the aspect of reference – i.e., what they refer to. Secondly, they vary in their function – i.e., 
in what one expects of them and what they are intended to clarify: how the visitor is intended 
to perceive them. This leads, thirdly, to the specific value that the museum (or a specialist 
discipline) ascribes to them, and fourthly to the way in which the museum typically or ideally 
presents work, specimen, or witness (which can vary widely and is being deliberately subverted 
increasingly often).
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Work Specimen Witness
Reference Author, originator Scientific systematics History, story
Function Aesthetic pleasure Evidence for a point in the 
system
Source of the past, 
authentication
Value standard Unique, authorized Typical, exemplary Ontological link to 
the past
Typical mode of 
display
Isolated Serial, relational Narrative
Just as important as the differences between them, however, is the fact that their status as 
work, specimen and witness is not assigned to things in any quasi-natural sense, but is the 
result of curatorial practice. The Mona Lisa might equally constitute a specimen if it were to 
be exhibited as a representative of sixteenth-century Italian art; the great hornbill could serve 
as a witness if a curator were telling the story of its discovery, its individual biography and the 
scientific context of that period; Adenauer’s Mercedes could be a work of art if its aesthetic 
beauty were to be emphasized by placing it on a pedestal in a white gallery room or under a 
glass cover. Although we are accustomed to exhibiting certain objects in a specific way – the 
painting as an art work in isolation and intensified or scientific objects as specimens in series 
– these exhibition practices follow conventions that obey the epistemic interests of specific 
disciplines and are conditioned by specific temporal circumstances (cf. Bennett 2005). The 
way in which objects appear to us above all follows the perceptual customs of a given time 
and the curatorial presentation practices to which the objects are subject. Today, more and 
more museums are breaking with these conventions in order to change the status of their 
objects. They present objects of daily life as if they were artworks and thus shift the objects’ 
cultural value from objects of nostalgia to objects of prestige. They challenge their visitors’ 
perceptions by placing objects in unexpected settings. Thus, these museums question the 
guiding ideas of the scientific context to which they belong as well as the expectations of their 
visitors. These curatorial interventions show that objects are not in themselves work, specimen, 
or witness; it is we who make them into these and in this way assign new meaning and new 
value to old objects.
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Notes
1 This essay was written during the course of a research project entitled ‘wissen&museum: 
Archiv – Exponat – Evidenz’, with financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research. I am grateful to Monique Scheer and Jessika Meyer for assistance and 
information, and to Michael Robertson for the translation.
2 This perspective on museum objects with its trifold focus on conventions of display, modes 
of perception and value attribution differs from familiar object typologies in museum studies 
(cf. Stransky 1974; Pomian 1990; Pearce 1993; Korff 2004). It understands its three types 
of objects as relational categories that depend primarily on curatorial practice. In this 
approach it differs from similar typologies such as those presented by Deloche/Mairesse 
2011.
3 On the relationship between originality as a concept referring to sources (and their critical 
inquiry) and authenticity as a concept referring to social context and meaning, cf. the 
debates among museologists, e.g., in Stránský 1985.
4 Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary, s.v. ‘original’.
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5 This development was not without precedent. Even in the sixteenth century, there had 
been a trade in collectors’ objects, with experts available to test whether the artworks and 
antiquities being offered were worth their price. Cf. the detailed account in Pomian 1990.
6 Pomian identifies a decisive caesura in the art market in Paris around 1750. Whereas art 
dealers had previously mixed originals and copies in their catalogues – works of undoubted 
attribution and those whose origins were unclear – the primary question that now had to 
be asked of a painting in order to determine one’s assessment of it was who its author 
was (cf. Pomian 1990: 148).
7 The concept of authenticity in art here differs from the concept of authenticity in the cultural 
sciences, for which authenticity means above all historical testimony and factual accuracy.
8 Jean Gabus in France wrote an early contribution to the discussion of the potential of 
museum objects as witnesses (cf. Gabus 1975). In Germany, it has also been discussed 
by Gottfried Korff (summarized in Korff 2007), and by Zbynek Stránský in the context of 
international museology (cf. Stránský 1974). 
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